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This paper proposes directly unproductive, profit-seeking (DUP)
activities as a general concept that embraces a wide range of recently
analyzed economic activities, including the subset of rent-seeking
activities considered by Krueger. It then proceeds to provide a syn-
thesis and generalization of the welfare-theoretic analysis of such
activities by developing a fourfold categorization of cases depending
on the levels of distortions before and after the DUP activity. Thus a
unification and overview of the subject are achieved.
In recent years, economists have increasingly turned to a theoretical
analysis of phenomena such as lobbying for protection, competing for
a share of industrial or import licenses, inducing legislatures to enact
monopolistic barriers to domestic entry, utilizing resources to evade
*'price" or "command" governmental regulations, etc.
In the area of international trade-theoretic analysis in particular, it
would hardly be an exaggeration to say that this has been among the
few leading topics of research focus recently. Thus, the theoretical
analysis of tarijf evasion, starting with Bhagwati and Hansen (1973),
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has witnessed further contributions by Johnson (1972), Bhagwati and
Srinivasan (1973), Sheikh (1974), Kemp (1976), Falvey (1978), Ray
(1978), and Pitt (1981). The theoretical analysis of activity whereby
claimants compete for premium-fetching import licenses, and what
may therefore be christened premium seeking, was begun in a seminal
paper by Krueger (1974) and extended by Bhagwati and Srinivasan
(1980). The theoretical analysis of revenue seeking, where economic
agents try to get a slice of the tariff revenue resulting from the
adoption of a protectionist tariff, has been initiated by Bhagwati and
Srinivasan (1980). The theoretical analysis oi tariff seeking, on the
other hand, where lobbies seek protectionist trade tariffs, has been
pioneered by Brock and Magee (1978) and has been recently de-
veloped by Bhagwati (1980), Feenstra and Bhagwati (1982), and
Findlay and Wellisz (1982). At the same time, in non-trade-theoretic
literature as well, there has been growing concern with lobbying and
related phenomena, as in the well-known papers of many distin-
guished writers, such as Tullock (1967, 1980) and Posner (1975).
In this paper, I begin in Section I by briefly discussing the common,
unifying essence of the phenomena so analyzed and then arguing why
they are best described as directly unproductive, profit-seeking (DUP)
activities. Next, I proceed in Section II to differentiate analytically
among different types of such activities, with a view to classifying
them into categories which are analytically meaningful from the view-
point of their welfare impact. Existing analyses of specific problems,
such as tariff seeking and revenue seeking, are then readily identified
in Section III as belonging to one such category or another, and the
welfare consequences demonstrated in these analyses are then shown
to be only specific illustrations of a wider class of DUP activities with
identical welfare consequences.
I. Directly Unproductive, Profit-seeking (DUP) Activities:
The Concept
The essential characteristic of the phenomena whose analysis has
recently been undertaken, and many of which have been referenced
above, is that they represent ways of making a profit (i.e., income) by
undertaking activities which are directly unproductive; that is, they
yield pecuniary returns but do not produce goods or services that
enter a utility function directly or indirectly via increased production
or availability to the economy of goods that enter a utility function.
Insofar as such activities use real resources, they result in a contrac-
tion of the availability set open to the economy. Thus, for example,
tariff-seeking lobbying, tariff evasion, and premium seeking for given
import licenses are all privately profitable activities. However, their
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direct output is simply zero in terms of the flow of goods and services
entering a conventional utility function: for example, tariff seeking
yields pecuniary income by changing the tariff and hence factor
rewards; evasion of a tariff yields pecuniary income by exploiting the
differential price between legal (tariff-bearing) imports and illegal
(tariff-evading) imports; and premium seeking yields pecuniary in-
come from the premia on import licenses. Thus, these are aptly
christened DUP activities. As an acronym, this can be pronounced
"dupe" activities, coming close to the spirit in which economists must
view these activities!'
This distinction between directly unproductive and productive ac-
tivities is somewhat reminiscent of the Physiocrats and the early
Marxists but, in contrast, has, in strictly economic terms, a perfect
claim to legitimacy. For example, lobbying to install a distortionary
tariff is undoubtedly directly unproductive from an economic view-
point, though it may possess a political legitimacy and value as con-
stituting an element of a vigorous, pluralistic democracy!
Krueger's (1974) analysis of what she christened "rent-seeking"
activities relates to a subset of the broad class of what are defined here
as DUP activities. She is concerned with the lobbying activities which
are triggered by different licensing practices of governments. Thus,
she lists large numbers of licensing practices leading to lobbying to
profit from the securing of such licenses. Also, her formal theoretical
analysis is concerned with a welfare comparison between import
licenses/quotas with attendant premium-seeking lobbying activity to
earn the premia on these licenses vis-a-vis equivalent tariffs which
were explicitly assumed not to attract any seeking activity. Thus, her
focus is exclusively on licensing/quantity restrictions and the rents
thereon,^ and her rent-seeking activities exclude from their scope
other DUP activities, for example, /?nc^-distortion-triggered DUP
activities, or distortion-^ng^g-mng- DUP activities.^
' The other acronymic alternative, christening them ZOP (zero-output, profit-
seeking) activities, is slightly less appealing on that account.
^ Historians of concepts and phrase making may note that, parallel to Krueger's
inspired phrase "rent seeking" to describe license-seeking activities, there is also the
phrase ''rentier society," used, e.g., in Bhagwati (1973) to describe much the same kind
of phenomenon. In addition, there is also the Leninist (Lenin 1939) use of the phrase
''rentnerstaat" by which was meant a "rentier state" or "usurer state" (1939, pp. 100-
101), i.e., a reni-receiving society. Marxists, who consider Schumpeterian capitalism to
be characterized by Joan Robinson's "animal spirits," also consider the rentnerstaat to be
the antithesis of the creative impulses underlying robust capitalism.
^ Krueger (1974, pp. 301-2) did mention minimum wage legislation, regulation of
taxi fares, and capital gains tax treatment in her concluding remarks as also examples of
rent seeking. However, her arguments concerning these are ambiguous, to say the least.
Thus, consider the following: "Capital gains tax treatment results in overbuilding of
apartments and uneconomic oil exploration" (p. 302). But this seems to be simply
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II. DUP Activities: A Taxonomy
With the general concept of DUP activities spelled out, the analysis
can now be addressed directly to the issue of the welfare consequences
of DUP activities.
From the viewpoint of the analysis of the welfare consequences of
DUP activities, evidently the most fruitful theory-informed taxonomy
must build on the distinction between distorted (or suboptimal) and
nondistorted (or optimal) situations. Thus, a DUP activity which uses
up resources in the context of a distortion may be paradoxically
welfare improving, whereas a similar DUP activity which destroys a
distortion and achieves a first-best, optimal outcome may be
paradoxically welfare worsening.
Noting that when distortions exist almost anything can happen, I
hasten to add that the theory and the resulting taxonomy which is
built into table 1, and which will be presently explained, presuppose
that the world is indeed distortion free except for the distortions with
which the DUP activity in question is related in an essential way. Thus,
if one considers premium seeking in Krueger's (1974) analysis, the
premium sought by the lobbyists is on distortionary quotas already in
place in the model. In her model, therefore, there is an unchanging
distortion in place when the directly unproductive premium seeking
is introduced, but there are no other distortions.
Next, I should clarify that the DUP activities which are considered
in the analysis that follows are wholly related to governmental
policies: For example, they involve changing these policies or evading
them. However, they can in principle be government free or exclu-
sively private. Thus, effort and resources may be (legally) expended
in getting a share of the "going" transfer by an economic agent, what
may be described as "altruism seeking." Or they may be expended on
(illegal) theft, as Tullock (1967) has considered. What I argue in this
paper can be simply extended to private activities, therefore, even
though virtually all examples chosen below concern governmental
policy-related DUP activities exclusively.
Furthermore, I make no distinction between activities that utilize
real resources directly and those that do not. For, while pure
transfers/bribes are often supposed to be resource free, they are not.
stating the traditional resource-(mis)allocational effects of a tax. At the same time,
another concluding paragraph does reiterate the view that her concept and theory of
rent seeking are intended to be wholly license or restriction created: "Finally, all market
economies have some rent-generating restrictions" (p. 302). The precise manner in
which Krueger's generic class of quota intervention-triggered "rent-seeking" activities
is a subset of the far more general class of DUP activities is set out fully in Bhagwati and
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The direct demand on real resources that a successfully transacted
bribe makes may be small, but it is not likely to be negligible.^
Finally, I distinguish between legal and illegal activities for two
reasons. First, the latter introduce the added element that they con-
stitute an independent element of the social loss insofar as illegality
must be considered to be socially disapproved. Besides, it is interest-
ing to note that, except on this dimension, the legal and illegal DUP
activities can be shown to belong to analytically equivalent categories
of our taxonomy, so that distinguishing between them is only with a
view to underlining their analytical similarity in the present context.
With these clarifying remarks, let me then turn to the taxonomy
underlying table 1. The taxonomy there, with an eye on welfare
analysis, is critically built on the fact that all such DUP activities will
involve either a distorted or a distortion-free situation, before and
after the undertaking of such activity. Thus, four critical classes of
DUP activities are distinguished as follows:
Category 1. Here, the initial and final situations are both
distorted.
Category 2. Here, the initial situation is distorted, but the
final situation (thanks to the DUP activity) is distortion free.
Category 3. Here, the initial situation is distortion free, but
the final situation is distorted.
Category 4. Here, the initial situation is distortion free
again, and so is the final situation (despite the DUP activity).
The fundamental distinction, however, remains that between catego-
ries 1 and 2 (which relate to initially distorted situations), on the one
hand, and categories 3 and 4 (which relate to initially distortion-free
situations).
I proceed then to demonstrate that, for DUP activities falling into
categories 1 and 2, a beneficial rather than immiserizing outcome is
paradoxically feasible, whereas for those falling into categories 3 and 4
it is not.^ The critical difference is that the former set have initial
^ Krueger (1974, p. 302) makes the interesting point that bribes can get reflected in
the expected returns from qualifying to be a civil servant and thus divert resources via
that route. However, the question is one of incidence here. If the government keeps
civil service salaries low, expecting that the bribes will make up the required difference
to attract a given volume of civil servants, the resource-impact analysis of bribes/
transfers gets more complex. One would then have to compare the bribe-induced
resource diversion with the resource diversion required to collect taxes to pay adequate
salaries when lump-sum taxes are unavailable: a unique rank ordering again would not
be generally possible.
5 While the focus here is on whether the beneficial DUP activity paradox can arise, it
is important to note that, with the second-best nature ignored, the problem in catego-
ries 1 and 2 (i.e., where there are initially distorted situations) will lead to other errors,
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situations that are distorted, whereas the latter set start with
distortion-free initial situations. The existing analyses of DUP activi-
ties, detailed above, are then assigned to these four categories, distin-
guishing further among legal and illegal activities.
III. Welfare Consequences of DUP Activities
The critical analytical point at issue is very simple. The diversion of
resources from directly productive to directly unproductive activities,
when undertaken in the context of initially distorted situations, is fun-
damentally different from such diversion occurring in the context of
initially distortion-free situations. For, in the latter case, the loss of
resources is occurring from a first-best situation and hence must
represent a social loss as well, whereas in the former case it is occur-
ring in a second-best situation and hence need not represent a social
loss but may well be beneficial. Analytically the paradox constituted by
the welfare improvement following from the undertaking of the
directly unproductive activity in a second-best situation is the same as
the paradox of immiserizing growth noted by Bhagwati (1958) and
Johnson (1967) and generalized in Bhagwati (1968). For, in the
former case, withdrawal of resources for unproductive activity and
hence "negative growth" is beneficial, and in the latter case (positive)
growth is immiserizing. And, of course, the "dual" of this is the
phenomenon of negative shadow prices of factors noted and analyzed
in Bhagwati, Srinivasan, and Wan (1978) and in Srinivasan and Bhag-
wati (1978).
Category 1
In this class of cases, the DUP activities are addressed to initially
distortion-ridden situations in an essential fashion. Two legal activities
so discussed in the literature are the Krueger (1974) phenomenon of
premium seeking and the Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1980) phenome-
non of revenue seeking.
Krueger's analysis of premium seeking postulates that, as a result
presumably of protectionist demands, import quotas have mate-
rialized and characterize the initial situation. The premium-fetching
import licenses then generate resource-using competition among po-
as noted for the case of revenue seeking and premium seeking by Bhagwati and
Srinivasan (1980). The taxonomic distinctions drawn here, therefore, are critical even if
the analyst is inclined to assert (fallaciously, in my judgment) that the beneficial DUP
activity paradox is unimportant in practice. On the question whether such second-best
paradoxes are likely to arise in practice, see the discussion in Bhagwati (1980) in the
specific context of tariff seeking.
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tential beneficiaries of the license allocation, and the analysis presup-
poses that the initial quota level remains unchanged. Therefore, the
Krueger analysis of premium seeking is essentially of a legal process of
DUP activity undertaken in the context of a distorted situation where
the distortion triggering off the DUP activity remains unchanged
through the analysis.
The same features characterize the Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1980)
analysis of revenue seeking: legal directly unproductive competition
for securing a share in the disbursement/transfer of tariff revenue
resulting incidentally in the imposition of a tariff thanks to protec-
tionist lobbying, the tariff thus being an exogenously specified, un-
changing distortion that triggers off the revenue seeking which is
being analyzed.
It is easy to demonstrate, as in fact Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1980)
have done already, that the lobbying activity being modeled can be
paradoxically beneficial despite being directly unproductive, the rea-
son for this paradox being that outlined above already. This possibil-
ity can arise also in the premium-seeking case (unless the quota is
defined purely in quantity terms, in which case the second-best possi-
bility of welfare improvement through DUP activity-induced changes
in outputs will be prevented by the pure trade constraint from spilling
over into the paradoxical outcome).^
Next, the existing analyses of illegal trade in the presence of tariffs
(and quotas) also fit immediately into the present category 1 of DUP
activities. For they assume that there is an initially distorting tariff,
and the tariff-evading activity is undertaken with this tariff remaining
in place through the analysis. In view of the theoretical analysis
developed above, it follows immediately that these analyses ought to
yield the conclusion that such tariff evasion may be welfare improving
(even allowing for the fact that the illegality carries an extra, negative
dimension), as they in fact do. Bhagwati and Hansen (1973), for
example, show this in a model where the extra real costs of illegality
in trade are incurred in the form of the traded goods themselves,
this being the "melting ice" assumption used by Samuelson (1954)
to model transportation costs within the confines of the two-by-two
model. Smuggling will be beneficial rather than immiserizing in this
model, even though it uses up real resources (in the form of pro-
duced, tradable goods), since it confers production and consumption
gains when the effective tariff is cut by the smuggling. The negative
weight attached to the illegality may be considered to be outweighed
by the gain noted above, which leaves the net evaluation still a benefi-
^ General propositions concerning the contrast between DUP activities triggered by
price and quantity distortions have been developed in Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1981)
and in Anam (1982).
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cial one. The paradox has repeated itself in the context of illegal
trade.
The foregoing examples of category 1-type DUP activities—
premium seeking, revenue seeking, and tariff or Q/? evasion—assume
that the specified distortion which triggers off such activity remains
exogenous to the activity. However, it is easy to imagine phenomena
where the distortion may be endogenous to such activity. Thus, reve-
nue seeking may affect adversely the protection implied by the tariff
which triggered off the revenue seeking. Bhagwati and Srinivasan
(1980) in fact demonstrate in the context of their general equilibrium
analysis of revenue seeking that the revenue seeking may lead to a
Metzler production paradox: The protectionist tariff plus revenue
seeking may lead to a lower output of the importable than under free
trade! If so, the protectionist lobby may well seek greater protection,
thus influencing in principle the original tariff distortion itself, mak-
ing therefore the eventual tariff level endogenous to revenue seeking.
But even this complexity would leave the phenomenon of revenue
seeking within the class of DUP activities squarely within category 1,
with its attendant paradox of possible welfare improvement from
such activities.
Category 2
In this class of DUP activities, the initial situation that triggers such
activities is still distorted, but the outcome turns out to be distortion
free.
This category is easily analyzed in light of the foregoing analysis of
category 1. Thus, the overall welfare impact of a DUP activity starting
from an initially distorted situation but ending in a distortion-free
situation is the sum of two effects:
The welfare impact of a with-
drawal of resources into the
direcdy unproductive activity,
holding the distortion un-
changed (i.e., category 1 type of
analysis)
^ or —ve
The welfare impact of
the elimination of the
distortion in the final
situation
The former effect, as I have argued already, is either positive or
negative; the latter, of course, is necessarily positive. The net outcome
may therefore be positive or negative. The welfare-improving
paradox obtains again, and so does the opposite quasi-paradox that a
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distortion-destroying lobbying activity may lead to immiserization and
hence be only a Pyrrhic victory.^
An instance of this, as implied by Findlay and Wellisz (1982) in the
context of the analysis of tariff seeking, would be when the resources
used up in restoring free trade that is to the lobby's economic advan-
tage are socially more valuable than the social gains from free trade.
An instance of illegal DUP activity of a similar nature would be when
the lobbying in the foregoing example was replaced by bribes to
congressmen to change their vote to free trade.
Category 3
The paradox of beneficial DUP activities disappears, however, as soon
as these activities are undertaken in the context of initially distortion-
free situations. Category 3 relates to these when the final situation is
the successful creation of a distorted situation.
Two classic examples of such category 3, legal DUP activities are
successful lobbying efforts at creating government-sanctioned
monopoly and lobbying to get tariff protection: monopoly seeking
and tariff seeking. In each such case, the total social loss imposed by
the DUP activity in question can be decomposed as the sum of two
effects:
The welfare effect of the
withdrawal of resources into
the directly unproductive ac-
tivity, assuming that no dis-
tortion has resulted
—ve
The welfare effect of the
position of the distortion, as-
suming that the resources
have already been diverted to
the directly unproductive ac-
tivity
~ve
Evidently, there is no source of gain here and hence no room for the
paradox of welfare improvement as with categories 1 and 2 above.
Thus, consider monopoly seeking in figure 1. In this small, closed
economy which produces a tP* initially, with welfare at f/*, the lobby
to secure a monopoly in good 1 production succeeds. The resources
expended in securing the monopoly shift the production possibility
curve down loA'B\ whereas the monopoly itself leads to nontangency
of the goods-price ratio with A'B' in equilibrium. Equilibrium pro-
duction and consumption therefore shift to P^,^, C^^ and welfare
declines to U^^ from t/*. The total decline in welfare then can be
decomposed into (1) the shift from t/* to U^ reflecting only the diver-
^ Remember again the caveat concerning pure quantity distortions discussed in
Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1981) and Anam
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FIG. 1.—Monopoly seeking
sion of resources from directly productive use to the lobbying activity
and the resulting move of production and consumption to F^, Cf, if it
is assumed hypothetically that monopoly has not resulted; and (2) the
further shift from C/^  to C/^ m coming from the admission of the
monopoly into the economy and the resulting move of production
and consumption to P/^^, Cfj^y respectively.®
Figure 2 illustrates the tariff-seeking case. The protectionist lobby,
starting from free trade at P*, manages in this small economy to
spend resources to get a tariff enacted. If we take only the diversion of
resources to lobbying into account, at free-trade prices production
would shift from P* to P* on the shrunk-in production possibility
curved ' 5 ' , which represents therefore a loss oiRS measured in terms
of good 1. Moreover, the tariff resulting from the successful lobbying
® A referee has commented that the use of Samuelsonian social indifference curves to
evaluate welfare may not be appropriate in figs. 1 and 2 on the following ground: "This
construction is valid only if lump-sum transfers are being deployed to optimize income
distribution. In response to any change in this distribution that the 'seeking' activities
achieve, the government must recalculate the lump-sum transfers to optimize the
Bergsonian welfare function again. This calls the whole process into question. Either
the seek activities will be abandoned, or they will extend into persuading the government
to abandon lump-sum transfer." However, the introduction of DUP activities is simply
adding new activities to traditionally defined productive activities on the income-
generating side in the model, with all of the given factors of production earning
competitively determined incomes. In principle, therefore, it is not necessarily im-
plausible to continue the use of Samuelsonian indifference curves as in the traditional
analyses without DUP activities. If this were not so, one would have to agree with the
referee that the analysis would then have to "do without social indifference curves,
relying on the usual vague aggregate CV or EV measures" or shift to invoking
Chipman-Moore type assumptions of identical, homothetic indifference curves for
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FIG. 2.—Tariff seeking
shifts the production point further to P^, which is the final observed
equilibrium under tariff seeking; this is tantamount to a further loss
ofQR in terms of good 1. These measures are conventional Hicksian
equivalent-variational measures, as before, at world prices. Thus the
overall loss (QS), as already explained, is decomposed into two con-
stituent elements, each of which is unambiguously negative.
A minor paradox does lurk here, however, which needs to be
noted, and it reflects much prevailing confusion. Though I have
recently dispelled it elsewhere (Bhagwati 1980), it merits a brief men-
tion in the present context. In figure 2, suppose that the total social
cost of tariff seeking, QS, were to be decomposed along an alternative
route: (1) the shift fromP* toPf along^5, which represents the social
cost of the tariff, if one assumes hypothetically that lobbying resources
are not yet expended so that it is as if the tariff has come about
exogenously; and then (2) the shift from Pf to Pf, from AB to A'B',
which represents the further shift as a result of the diversion of
resources to lobbying, if one assumes the tariff distortion is in place.
In this case, the first element of the decomposition will always yield a
social loss (WS); however, as illustrated in figure 2 and reflecting the
second-best considerations outlined in the analysis of categories 1 and
2 above, the second element may well yield a gain (WQ). While
therefore the overall impact of category 3 activities must be necessarily
negative (QS), it would be incorrect to assert or imply that the social
cost of a distortion imposed without the aid of directly unproductive
activity must be necessarily less than that of the same distortion
imposed thanks to such activity; that is, in figure 2, the shift fromPf
to P^ need not always be a social cost and is, in fact, shown to be a
social gain worth WQ,
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Finally, these conclusions can be readily extended to examples of
illegal activities in category 3. An instance of this kind would be
provided by tariff evasion or smuggling from an optimal, rather than
a distortionary, tariff.
Category 4
The final category of DUP activities is provided by those which,
starting with an initially distortion-free situation, wind up also with a
distortion-free situation despite the resources expended in such ac-
tivities. A simple but effective example of such an activity is provided
by Findlay and Wellisz (1982) and suggested by Tullock (1967) as well,
where tariff seeking by one lobby is offset by tariff-averting lobbying
by another group, and the result is that resources are used up in
mutually deterring lobbying that does not affect free-trade policy for
the small country in the end. Figure 2 would illustrate this case, with a
slight reinterpretation. Now, there is evidently a shrinking-in of the
production possibility set for goods 1 and 2 from AB to A'B' as re-
sources are diverted to the lobbying activities and therewith a social
loss of RS in terms of good 1 since i^* is now the actual postlobbying
equilibrium, characterized by continuing free trade. The diversion of
resources from productive use when the first-best policy (of free trade
in this small competitive economy) is in place throughout must obvi-
ously be immiserizing.^ There is no room for paradoxes of any kind
here.
Category 4 then is the clearest case of DUP activities where the
simple claims of the early analysts of such activities about their nega-
tive impact can be sustained without the slightest qualification. But
this is also clearly a very narrow subset of the entire range of activities
that have been considered in the present paper.
IV. Concluding Remark
This paper has then provided a complete theory and taxonomy of the
welfare consequences of DUP activities. The existing literature is in
consequence synthesized within a general welfare-theoretic frame-
work. The results are summarized in table 1.
^ An inference of illegal profit-seeking DUP activity in category 4 would be that of
theft which utilizes real resources in attempts at both undertaking and evading it but
without creating any distortion (cf. Tullock 1967).
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